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Foreword

‘South Africa is our dream; Rwanda our nightmare. The dream can become a reality, but not overnight.’

These words were written in 1994 by the Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka to encapsulate the existential problem facing Africa today. Was the wave of democratisation in the 1990s a sign that positive change is on the way? Or should the indescribable horrors of the genocide in Rwanda instead make us pessimistic about the future of Africa? The answer to these questions depends to some extent on the time perspective we choose. In 1999, the Japanese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Keizo Takemi, opened his address on Japan’s African policy as follows: ‘I am convinced that Africa has a bright future ahead of it. For the past four centuries, Africa has been in an extremely disadvantageous position, both historically and geographically. However, slavery has now been abolished, colonialism has ended, the Cold War is over and apartheid has been dismantled. The time has come for Africans themselves to build their future.’¹

In its report ‘Can Africa claim the 21st Century?’, the World Bank concludes that Africa could resolve its development crisis in a single generation.² However, security and stability are absolutely vital if this immense task is to succeed. Unfortunately, they are all too frequently absent in Africa. Moreover, human rights are still systematically abused in far too many African countries. Yet if the requirements of security and stability could be met – an aspiration that is currently no more than a distant prospect for a continent plagued by conflict and violence – then many more Africans would be able to lead a ‘normal’ life and Africa’s problems of underdevelopment could be tackled. Furthermore, a secure and stable Africa would ultimately benefit the whole of the international community. The absence of security and stability is the main problem facing countries in Africa, and it is this issue that this advisory report seeks to address. The fear is that it will take several generations before African countries manage to overcome the effects of their armed conflicts. This advisory report is therefore entitled ‘Africa’s Struggle’, given that the continent is confronted with the dual task of curbing and overcoming the use of violence and addressing its own political, economic and social development.

Dutch policy on Africa

On 17 August 1999, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation presented the Parliament with a memorandum on Africa. In it, they pledged to pursue an integrated and coherent policy on Africa in which political, economic and development instruments would be considered and formulated as a consistent whole. The government’s two main objectives are to promote security and stability and good governance and good policy, particularly in countries on the so-called ‘18 + 4 list’. The Africa memorandum lists nine developing

1 Address by the Japanese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Professor Keizo Takemi, ‘Japan’s Policy towards Africa’, Dar es Salaam 1999. Source: www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ssv9905/policy.html.

2 The World Bank, ‘Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?’, Washington 2000, p. 3.

countries in Africa which are 'making visible efforts' to bring about good governance and good policy. The Netherlands has therefore entered into a structural bilateral relationship with these countries. They are Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Since the outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Dutch government has frozen aid to both countries but has kept them on the list. It is prepared to resume aid gradually, depending on the progress of the peace process. Rwanda was recently added to the list of countries with which the Netherlands has a structural, bilateral relationship.³

The Netherlands also has a structural bilateral relationship with Egypt, despite the fact that it is less poor than the countries mentioned above. The Netherlands' relationship with South Africa will be continued for a limited period. The Netherlands is working with Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Namibia and Zimbabwe on human rights and peace-building programmes. (Rwanda was included in this programme but these activities have now been transferred to the bilateral programme.) The Netherlands is conducting an environmental programme with Benin (under the Sustainable Development Agreement), Cape Verde and Senegal. Several countries are eligible for the private sector programme, namely Cape Verde, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Other countries with which the Netherlands has a development relationship are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, the Seychelles and Sudan.⁴ On balance, therefore, the Dutch government has links with 35 African countries, and a long-term development relationship with 11 of them.

The Netherlands is investigating ways of helping to reform the security sector in various African countries (including Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Malawi and Benin) in an effort to promote security and stability.

In its explanatory memorandum to the 2001 budget for foreign affairs and development cooperation, the government reiterates its determination to formulate an integrated policy to help promote security and stability in Africa. To this end, the government is also concentrating on peace-building in post-conflict situations. In the meantime, the structural development relationship with the eligible developing countries in Africa will be developed further.

The Netherlands recently called for a multilateral approach to the problem of security and stability in Africa. At the Netherlands' request, the EU General Affairs Council discussed conflicts in Africa based on an analysis by the EU High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy.

The Netherlands also used its membership of the United Nations Security Council to include security in Africa on the United Nations agenda. In September 1999, the Security Council held a meeting on Africa chaired by the Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok. Similar discussions were held as part of the recently organised 'Africa month',

3 The acting Minister for Development Cooperation, Letter to the President of the House of Representatives of the States General concerning the list of countries with which the Netherlands has a structural development cooperation relationship, The Hague, 11 September 2000.

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa memorandum, The Hague 1999, p. 26.

which focused mainly on the trade in, and production of, small arms. The Dutch government has resolved to monitor the progress of the policy initiatives that have been adopted. The Netherlands is also helping to boost Africa's peace-building capacity through the provision of training and financial support. And finally, the Dutch government makes a financial contribution to the Organisation of African Unity.⁵

Request for advice

On 20 January 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) to produce an advisory report on security and stability in Africa. In the belief that the Africans themselves hold the key to peace on their continent, the request for advice put forward four arguments stating why the Netherlands should support African efforts to attain security and stability:

- First of all, devoting more attention to conflicts in Africa is in the Netherlands' own interest. Instability in Africa affects Europe's security. Consequences could include increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, and the export of criminal activity (drug-related crime in particular). The loss of current or potential trading partners could also affect Europe;
- A second argument for supporting peace and stability in Africa is that many African countries and organisations lack the financial and/or institutional capacity to intervene in time when a crisis is imminent. Intervention early in a conflict, before violence breaks out, is more effective and cheaper than intervention after a situation has escalated.
- A third argument for Dutch support is based on the fact that around half the Netherlands' funds for bilateral development cooperation are spent in Africa. As the request puts it: 'Development cooperation and politics are inseparable. Security and stability create a positive climate for development, and socio-economic development in turn fosters security and stability. This justifies a broad, integrated and coherent approach of the kind we advocated in the memorandum on Africa and in the spirit of the UN Secretary General's report on the causes of conflict'.
- Finally, concern for humanitarian aspects is another reason for promoting security and stability in Africa.

Following a summary of the main lines of Dutch policy on Africa and a discussion of the possible causes of conflicts, the request for advice put the following questions to the AIV:

- What is the AIV's view on the development of security and stability in Africa?
- How should security and stability in Africa be promoted?
- What contributions can international partners and the Netherlands in particular make to the promotion of security and stability in Africa?
- Which aspects of Dutch policy could be made more coherent?

The request for advice is included with this advisory report as Annexe 1.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Explanatory memorandum to the 2001 budget, p. 7 and pp. 32, 33.

Definitions and delimitations

The ministers' request for advice raises the question of whether the Netherlands' efforts to promote security and stability can be targeted at Africa as a whole. The situation in Africa is extremely varied: some countries, such as Sudan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Sierra Leone, are involved in an armed conflict, whereas in others (such as Ethiopia and Eritrea) hostilities appear to have ended; others still (Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon) are making clear progress towards peace despite the continued security risks. Some African cities, such as Addis Ababa, are safe to walk in at night while others, such as Johannesburg, are extremely dangerous. Yet although each region and country in Africa has its own individual history, and each conflict in Africa is the result of unique circumstances and events, the various regions and countries in Africa do nevertheless share enough historical, social and cultural similarities, as well as a comparable international political and economic status, to justify the use of the generalisations 'Africa' and 'African'. The use of these and other generalisations is in no way intended to undermine the rich diversity of countries and regions on the African continent, their history and culture, or their political, economic and social development. It should also be noted that this advisory report focuses on the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The AIV has discussed the moral, political and international law aspects of military intervention during humanitarian crises in an earlier report.⁶ This aspect will therefore only briefly be touched on in this paper. Aspects of government policy relating to development cooperation will of course be discussed throughout. Chapter VII will highlight the bilateral elements of this policy.

Security and stability in a wider sense involve more than simply the prevention of violence. In Africa, the breakdown of security and stability is also linked to problems of food security, poverty (unemployment, income level), economic decline, scarcity of natural resources (commodities, water, inputs), environmental degradation, social inequality, human rights violations and the fuelling of ethnic and/or religious tensions.⁷ However, the AIV will restrict itself in this advisory report mainly to a discussion of security and stability in relation to current and potential violent crises.

Conflicts can be sparked off by any of the factors listed above in various combinations. A distinction must however be made between factors that directly trigger conflicts and the more indirect, underlying causes of conflicts. In Africa, poverty is a significant contributory factor. Poverty (which may cause would-be protagonists to feel they have no prospects or little to lose) can lower the threshold for participation in an armed struggle, especially among young people. As well as increased status, participation also offers the prospect of an immediate, albeit short-lived, rise in income and the fulfilment of personal ambitions. In that sense, poverty can

6 AIV and CAVV (Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law), Humanitarian intervention, report no. 13 (April 2000).

7 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Sipri Yearbook 2000 – 'Armaments, Disarmament and International Security'* (Oxford, University Press, 2000), pp. 4, 5. (This document will subsequently be referred to as the *Sipri Yearbook 2000*).

be regarded as a contextual factor which can influence an individual's decision about whether or not to participate in an armed conflict.

A map of the areas of conflict in Africa is included as Annexe 2.

Prospects for increasing security and stability in Africa

The AIV considered ways in which the Netherlands could improve security and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, the size and complexity of the problem means that an effective solution cannot be limited to a single policy area. Similarly, it would be unrealistic to expect the Netherlands to come up with a viable bilateral solution, particularly as its existing development cooperation policy is directed mainly at countries that are already pursuing good governance and good policy. (The precise definition of 'good governance' in the African context is not discussed in this report, nor how the policy is conducted in practice.) Countries lacking in security and stability do not qualify for structural development aid; they are only eligible for programmes relating to, for example, human rights and democracy or emergency aid. Within this context, development cooperation can only make a limited contribution to resolving issues of security and stability. The recommendations formulated in this advisory report are therefore primarily standpoints and views that the Netherlands can put forward in a multilateral context, unless it is expressly indicated that the Netherlands can perform the activity concerned bilaterally.

In this advisory report, the AIV calls for continued international, European and Dutch involvement in Africa, partly in the light of the various political, historic, economic and other links which the Netherlands and Europe have with the continent. The report should be seen as a plea for concentrated efforts by the Netherlands to make Africa more secure (or less insecure) and more stable (or less unstable). The lack of security and stability in countries and regions in Africa is standing in the way of their development. It is primarily the responsibility of African governments and organisations themselves to bring about the necessary improvements. Because some of the causes of instability and insecurity in Africa lie outside the continent, the need for international, European and Dutch involvement is very relevant. These recommendations therefore focus on the development of state structures based on the 'rule of law'.

Following a general outline of oppositions and conflicts in Africa (chapter I), this paper discusses the state in Africa (chapter II). It then examines issues relating to armament (chapter III), economic factors, chiefly from the perspective of the lack of security and stability in Africa (chapter IV), the social context (chapter V) and human rights (chapter VI). A separate chapter deals with the question of international, European and Dutch commitment to security and stability in Africa (chapter VII). It concludes with a summary of conclusions and recommendations (chapter VII).

Acknowledgements

The AIV appointed an Africa Committee consisting of representatives of its various permanent committees to draw up this advisory report. The Committee members were: Professor E.J. de Kadt (chairman), Dr O.B.R.C. van Cranenburgh, Professor F. van Dam, Dr P.P. Everts, Professor C. Flinterman*, Professor B. de Gaay Fortman, Professor J.W. Gunning, Professor K. Koch, Professor I. Wolffers, E.M. Schoo, J.F. Timmer and Professor N.J. Schrijver*. Members whose names are marked with an

asterisk (*) assisted in the compilation of the advisory report by correspondence. E. Chr. W. van der Laan, of the Africa Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was official adviser to the committee. C.E. van Dullemen, Secretary to the AIV's Development Cooperation Committee, was secretary to the committee, assisted by A.C. Buyse, B.J. Rip and G.D. van der Staaij (trainees); F. van Beuningen, Secretary to the AIV, edited the text of the recommendations.

To assist in the preparation of this advisory report, the chairman and the secretary of the Development Cooperation Committee attended a five-day conference entitled 'The Challenges for Governance in Africa' at Wilton Park, Sussex, in 1999. E.M. Schoo and the Secretary of the Development Cooperation Committee also attended a conference entitled 'Development Implications of Civil Conflicts in Africa: The Economics of Civil Conflicts in Africa', organised by the Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa, 2000). The chairman held discussions on security and stability in Africa at the United Nations with officials of the Dutch Permanent Representation, Ambassador A.P. van Walsum, P. Genée, A. Kooijmans and Major-General K. Roos, and with T. Zerihoun (Director of the UN's Africa I Division), Y. Mahmoud (Director of the UN's Africa II Division), M. Vogt, (Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary General I. Fall) and Ambassador I. Gambari (Deputy UN Secretary General) (New York, 2000).

Various experts on peace and security and on Africa were kind enough to share their information and insights with the Africa Committee. These experts were: Dr S. Ellis (African Studies Centre, University of Leiden), C. Niehaus (former ambassador to South Africa), Dr I. van Kessel (African Studies Centre, University of Leiden), Dr K. van Walraven (African Studies Centre, University of Leiden), H. Dop (Military Information Service) and B. Vashee (Transnational Institute).

The AIV is immensely grateful to all those involved for their willingness to share their information and insights with members of the Africa Committee.

The AIV adopted this report during its meeting on 15 December 2000.

I **Oppositions and conflicts in Africa: general outline of the situation**

Most of the 27 major conflicts that took place throughout the world in 1999 were in Africa⁸ – the vast majority, in fact, if smaller conflicts are also taken into account⁹. The majority of new violent conflicts break out in Africa, which is the only continent to have seen an increase in the number of armed conflicts since 1995. Most of these are internal civil wars within states.¹⁰

Around a fifth of the African population lives in countries affected by armed conflicts. One in every 150 Africans is a refugee. Average income in Africa is less than half that in Asia and less than one-eighth that in Europe or North America.¹¹ Average per capita income in Africa is below what it was at the end of the 1960s.¹² One-third of all skilled African workers leave the continent to seek employment overseas.¹³ More than a million people die of malaria each year. Over 24 million Africans are HIV positive, and more than 10 per cent of the population in 16 countries have contracted the virus.¹⁴

This is the background against which armed conflicts occur in Africa. The strategic aims of the warring parties can range from the acquisition of political power or hegemony within a country or region to the exploitation of natural resources. Armed conflicts can be motivated by political or economic tensions, or by ethnic or religious differences between groups within a state, which are then exploited by political leaders. In many cases, the outbreak of hostilities causes the warring parties to commit general atrocities, including against unarmed civilians.

As mentioned in the Foreword, conflicts in Africa are sparked off by different combinations of political, economic, socio-cultural and other factors. Prevailing explanations for armed conflicts in Africa cover many aspects, and there are as many potential causes of conflicts as there are identified aspects:

8 Sipri Yearbook, pp. 15 – 17, esp. table 1.1 and figure 1.1.

9 See B. Jongman, 'Oorlog en politiek geweld', in: B. Bomert and T. van den Hoogen (eds), 'Internationale Veiligheidsvraagstukken in het Nederlands perspectief'. Peace and Security Yearbook 1999 (Nijmegen, 1999), pp. 37 – 60, esp. tables 2, 3 and 4.

10 Sipri Yearbook, p. 17 and p. 47.

11 Collier, P., Elbadawi, I. and Sambanis, N., 'Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?, Prevention of Future Conflicts and Promotion of Inter-Group Cooperation', paper for the ECA conference, Addis Ababa 2000, p. 6.

12 The World Bank, 'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?', p. 1.

13 International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Source: www.iom.int.

14 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, 2000.

- 1) 'the new chaos' theory is defined largely by economic factors, one of the most important being the scarcity of natural resources (water, agricultural land, food, etc.) which is leading to environmental degradation resulting in enmity, chaos and violence;¹⁵
- 2) the 'economy of conflict' theory assumes a rational choice for violence with economic benefits as an objective. The armed struggle, directed by 'warlords', is played out mainly in regions from where commodities, timber or other natural resources can be exported. Links with foreign companies and profits from looting are also crucial factors;¹⁶
- 3) other explanations centre on the weakness of the African political system: according to this explanation, the neo-patrimonial approach of many African governments – which involves a strong, personal relationship between politicians and their supporters and which can in some cases lead to nepotism – is being threatened by the economic recession and the scaling down of aid following the end of the Cold War. Violence is here seen as a tool in a fierce political power struggle;¹⁷
- 4) the negative consequences of globalisation for countries in Africa are also seen as a possible contributory factor in conflicts. They include chiefly the negative economic implications of reforms demanded of African states by the IMF and the World Bank. One of these consequences could be to weaken a country's central authority to the extent that group identity gains the upper hand over national identity. This, together with the informalisation of the economy and the erosion of social and economic rights, can give rise to political movements based on group identity;¹⁸
- 5) other explanatory factors are based on socio-cultural aspects and emphasise the importance of historical developments and cultural backgrounds: violence at state level can be traced back to the everyday violence committed mainly by groups of marginalised youngsters who seek recourse to criminal activities.¹⁹

Armed conflicts and wars are difficult to bring under control. Once a conflict is over, there is a significant risk of a new conflict flaring up near the site of a previous struggle. In some regions (West Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region), armed conflicts are the norm rather than the exception. The regional spread of conflicts is caused primarily by the more visible consequences of armed conflicts – the mass exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, and attempts by political leaders in adjacent states to benefit by supporting one of the warring factions. A second factor in the spread of conflicts is that armed struggles tend to lead to a shift in the balance of power within a country or region. Not only does this give external protagonists the chance to become directly involved in existing conflicts, but it also allows them to take on

15 Kaplan, R.D., 'The Coming Anarchy', in: *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994.

16 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 'On economic causes of civil war', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 1998, 50, no. 4, pp. 513-573; Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *The World Bank*, Washington 2000.

17 Joseph, R., *State, 'Conflict and Democracy in Africa'*, London 1999; Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P., 'Africa works: disorder as political instrument,' *The International African Institute*, Oxford 1999.

18 Kaldor, M. and Vashee, B. (ed.), 'New Wars', London 1997; Duffield, M., 'War and Famine', Oxford 1994.

19 Ellis, S., 'Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', in: *African Affairs*, 1995, 94, 375, pp. 165-197.

opponents who are already tied up elsewhere. It is this proliferation of armed conflicts and escalating destabilisation which makes the violence so difficult to curb.

One example of this, and of the complex and many-layered nature of conflicts, is the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. International and domestic issues, together with the struggle for control of natural resources, are all interdependent and contributory factors. Moreover, although peace treaties have regularly been concluded, they have just as often been overturned. Since the summer of 1999, the armies of Uganda and Rwanda - countries whose political leaders had previously been praised for their efforts to subdue the conflict surrounding the Democratic Republic of Congo – have regularly been involved in clashes. The motive for this conflict is both to win political influence and to gain control of the gold and diamond mines and coffee concessions. This shows that once armed conflicts have broken out, they are difficult to contain. The many international diplomatic peace efforts that have been broached have done little to stop wars or armed conflicts in Africa.²⁰ The recent agreement signed in Algiers to end the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an exception. In this case, however, Ethiopia had gained the upper hand in the struggle and this assisted the suspension of hostilities.

The many factors involved in armed conflicts make it difficult to predict which oppositions or tensions will spark off a violent struggle. Nor can literature on 'early warning' and 'early action' predict which combination of factors will erupt into an armed conflict in specific cases, or when. While there is no shortage of warnings, there is insufficient capacity to adequately interpret them and insufficient political will to devise an internationally concerted response.²¹

The analysis of security risks also looks back over the history of Africa. A report by the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, cites the arbitrary partitioning of Africa by the Congress of Berlin (1885) as a factor which could still precipitate conflicts.²² National borders are the product of specific historical balances of power and circumstances, and the route taken by those borders is therefore characterised by a degree of subjectivity. A particular feature of the borders between many African states is that they are the result of agreements concluded between colonial powers at the end of the nineteenth century. The fact that Africa's borders are more often the product of the balance of power between colonial governments than of an internal African balance of power means that they are often subject to dispute. However, attempts to draw a 'natural' or ethnic border do not provide a solution since there will never be consensus about what is 'natural' or 'ethnically pure'. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and its member states are reluctant to become embroiled in a debate concerning the possible break-up of states or the redrawing of national borders.

20 Strategic Survey 1999/2000 – International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, OUP 2000), p. 247.

21 Clingendael Institute, 'Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organisations', The Hague 1996.

22 Boutros-Ghali, B., 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa', UN, 1998.

Whatever the sources of conflicts, their cost in terms of human lives, serious environmental damage and missed political, economic and social opportunities is unacceptably high. Frequent human rights abuses, the growing number of refugees and displaced persons, the degradation of the environment and of natural habitats, the spread of contagious diseases such as Aids, the proliferation of arms and the destruction of infrastructure all undermine security and stability. The declining opportunities for educating and training young people and the growing culture of immunity from punishment in the regions and countries affected by war and armed conflicts are leaving their mark on an entire generation. This is placing a heavy burden on the future of Africa.

11 *Algemeen Dagblad*, 3 November 2000.

12 'Onmacht en kippendrift – De Tweede Kamer wil strenger controleren maar weet niet hoe' ('Powerless frenzy: the House of Representatives wants to get tough but doesn't know how'); *NRC Handelsblad*, 10 June 2000.

13 Estimate of expenditure required for the House of Representatives in 2001, and designation and estimate of income, House of Representatives, 1999-2000 session, 27 082, No. 6, p. 1.

14 *Ibid*, No. 12, pp. 1 and 5.

15 Debate on the estimate of expenditure required for the House of Representatives in 2001, and designation and estimate of income (21 June 2000), House of Representatives 89, 89-5743.

16 Interview with the president and secretary general of the House of Representatives, Ms J. van Nieuwenhoven and Mr W.H. de Beaufort respectively, on 6 November 2000.

II The state in Africa: background

III.1 Sovereignty and state-building

State-building in Africa has proved to be a process of falling down, getting up and starting again. Many states are at the stage of 'primitive central state power accumulation'.²³ Institutions are still rudimentary and barely able to deliver services or public amenities. Although African states enjoy the formal, international trappings of sovereignty (recognition by other states, UN membership), their national sovereignty is less solid, in that their governments lack effective and recognised authority over their own populations. There is a constant risk of the institutions or the state itself buckling under the burden of political and social rivalries.

Countries undermined by internal tensions and armed conflicts can be classified as 'failed states'. These states have, as it were, 'imploded'. In them, the instruments of state (the armed forces and the police) have simply become additional protagonists vying for power. In such cases, the collapse of the centralised authority – however fragile it may have been – may cause citizens to turn their backs on the state and transfer their loyalties to ethnic, religious or other groupings. At the same time, these citizens continue to depend on their links with politicians, whose control of what remains of the apparatus of state gives them ongoing access to capital, including foreign aid and investments. Moreover, 'failed states' provide an ideal breeding ground for international criminal networks, which flourish in the twilight zone between peace and burgeoning conflicts. The distinction between insurrection, separatist movements and crime in such situations of 'statelessness' is exceptionally difficult to draw. In 'failed states', the international community also has no point of contact through which to help end the conflict or reduce crime.

Many African states are faced with the difficult task of surviving at a time when they cannot exercise their internal authority, even though their sovereignty may be internationally recognised. In such cases, the state is little more than a façade concealing a lack of capacity to conduct policy, a situation that is further aggravated by undisciplined officials, corruption and nepotism.

Obviously there are also important differences between African states. Nevertheless, there are a number of unmistakable characteristics that they all share: an underdeveloped 'civil society', a concentration of power among too few politicians, a political system based on favouritism and a centralised authority whose legitimacy is limited. It is the lack of properly functioning institutions within African states that is reducing their chances of development.

II.2. Internal divisions within states

National unity and state-building were key elements during the struggle for independence in Africa. Now, however, Africans appear to feel more loyalty towards specific

23 Brown, Cohen and Organski, quoted in: Ayoob, M., *State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure: Explaining the Roots of 'Third World' Insecurity*, in: Goor, L. van der et al, *Between Development and Destruction, An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States*, The Hague 1996.

groupings within states (a clan or tribe) than with the central government. They feel themselves be more Masai than Kenyan, more Ovambo than Namibian. Such distinctions can create religious, political, economic, cultural, regional and ethnic divisions within states. The potential for internal conflicts will remain limited provided most of these divisions do not coincide and loyalties and interests remain divided – i. e. as ‘cross cutting cleavages’, keeping the various groupings apart. However, if they do come together, then there may be a clash of these irreconcilable differences. The danger of violent internal crises is especially present in societies where the population consists primarily of a handful of strongly polarised groups.²⁴ Under such circumstances, there is a risk of elites using ‘ethnic rhetoric’ to mobilise their supporters. Ethnicity can spark off a conflict in an unstable environment in which the balance of power between national groupings is subject to change. Distribution problems can be a factor here, as can the inflow of refugees.

In situations where the population cannot – or can no longer – rely on a central government due to the collapse of centralised institutions, there is a real danger that they will fall back on their own group, whether that group is based on ethnic, cultural, religious or other lines. Patronage and nepotism strengthen the grip of an elite on its supporters, and this reinforces existing social divisions. Under such circumstances, the only recourse open to ‘excluded’ groups is often to try to ‘take over’ the machinery of state so that they can at least enjoy some of the economic benefits that are to be had. Because cooperation with the army and/or armed groups is essential, coups and seizures of power are inherent to these situations.

Even in countries where the ‘failed state’ has not yet led to extreme situations, political parties tend to function less as vehicles for public representation and accountability than as instruments for the exercise of power and its redistribution. Power is sought because it brings with it economic or other benefits. This is the socioeconomic context in which multi-party elections are being introduced in Africa.

II.3. Elections and democratisation

Forty-two of the forty-eight Sub-Saharan countries have held multi-party elections since the early 1990s. Internal opposition to prevailing regimes, the influence of the political upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and pressure from donor governments have all contributed to this process. Donor governments have supported elections, sent international observers and in some cases even helped to finance political parties. The value of the democratisation process is beyond dispute. However, elections do not always in themselves lead to the desired result.

In one or two cases, the power struggle generated by elections has even been counter-productive. The 1992 elections in Kenya, for example, led to political instability, human rights violations and atrocities akin to ethnic cleansing. It may therefore be asked whether donor governments should in fact support elections in situations where political and civil rights and freedoms are being seriously undermined.²⁵

24 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. On economic causes of civil war; Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War.

25 Cranenburgh, O. van, ‘Meerpartijenverkiezingen in Afrika, de averechtse effecten van politieke aanpassing’ [Multi-party elections in Africa: the negative effects of political reform], in: Internationale Spectator, April 1997, pp. 214-217.

As mentioned, access to the power of the state also provides access to economic resources which can in turn be passed on to one's own supporters. This makes the political struggle for power extremely fierce, and can even persuade opposition MPs to 'cross the floor' to join the winning party. The role of the opposition parties is chiefly to compete for power and, to a lesser extent than in established democracies, to monitor the policy of the incumbent government. After all, oversight of policy does not provide access to financial resources. The Westminster system which has been adopted by some African countries reinforces the principle of 'winner takes all'.

Democratisation is therefore about more than simply holding elections. It is a lengthy process, given that it is about building institutions which are firmly embedded in the society of the African countries concerned.

During the 1990s, donors spent a substantial amount on sending observers to elections, generally as part of an international initiative, as a way of promoting democracy in Africa. However, these international observers tended to be present chiefly on the day of the election itself rather than during the run-up to the voting or its aftermath. As a result, in one or two cases, the outcome of elections was judged more positively by international than by local observers. Little was therefore done to tackle electoral improprieties (fraud, deception, coercion and bribery, including during the electoral registration process, etc.).

The AIV believes that the Dutch government should place the monitoring of elections in the broader context of support for democratisation processes in African countries. The basic aim should continue to be to ensure that civil and political rights in the country concerned are adequately respected and that the security situation allows elections to be held. In addition to election monitoring in the strict sense, the AIV also recommends that the Dutch government provide support for the technical and logistical preparation and implementation of elections. This could include help with the deployment of local observers, the supply of ballot papers and ballot boxes, the distribution of information to voters and the training of staff at polling stations.

Support for, and involvement in, preparations for elections are a more effective way of evaluating how they are run and of identifying electoral malpractice early on than monitoring on the day of the election alone. The experience gained in providing support for elections can be deepened by appointing an official working party to supervise this assistance, by asking the Minister for Development Cooperation to submit periodic reports to the House of Representatives of the States General, and by evaluating Dutch involvement in election monitoring and including these evaluations in the reports to the House. Such professionalisation of the election monitoring process ties in well with the European Union's proposals to improve the planning and coordination of election monitoring activities by the member states.²⁶

The Dutch government has provided support to political parties in African countries. One of these is the Foundation for the New South Africa (SNZA), which was founded in 1994 to further the political process in South Africa, mainly among political parties. Between 1997 and 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed NLG 12 million to the SNZA. It has also pledged NLG 6.3 million to political parties in Mozambique over a three-year period.

²⁶ European Commission Communication no. (2000) 191, 11 April 2000.

Unfortunately, the Dutch government has reported little on the effects of its support for political parties. It is important to recognise that such support could be seen as an attempt to influence the internal political balance of power in a country.

In view of the lengthy process described above, the key aim of which, according to the AIV, is to help build democratic institutions which are firmly embedded in African civil society, the AIV recommends great caution when considering the provision of financial support to political parties. Funding can perhaps instead be given to the International Parliamentary Union to help it to create the right circumstances for political parties in African countries to call their governments to account through the parliamentary process.

III Arms, armament and armed groups

III.1 The role of the armed forces and the police

The armed forces and the police are both part of the problem of conflict and violence in Africa and at the same time responsible for containing and resolving conflicts. In states where opposition between rival groups is polarised, as described earlier, it is essential for these forces to be able to control the means of conflict, since there is always the risk of an armed struggle arising. In such cases, the army and police generally do not have a monopoly on the possession of arms; other groups also have weapons with which to defend themselves or strengthen their power base.

In African countries where the authority of central government has been undermined, the army and police therefore cannot provide an effective answer to the danger posed by armed groups since they themselves have to some extent collapsed and become part of these groups. As a result, internal security in African countries is susceptible to 'privatisation' in the sense that it tends to be private groups rather than the state which protect the population. This is generally done using mafia-style tactics whereby one armed group will agree to protect the public from another in exchange for disproportionate sums of money extorted through intimidation.

The effect of intervention by private security or military organisations is frequently decisive yet short-lived. Once these organisations withdraw from the conflict, the shift in the balance of military power causes the violence to flare up again. The international community has no strategy for dealing with these private militias, nor are these groups in any way coordinated or regulated.

III.2 Security Sector Reform

Until quite recently, donors showed little interest in the build-up of the security sector and often assumed that spending on defence largely undermined development efforts. Now, however, the Netherlands and other donors are co-financing 'Security Sector Reform' activities, although the policy is still in its infancy.²⁷ In their bilateral relationships with African countries, donors must try to help the military and police forces to be more receptive to outside control, primarily by the parliament of the country concerned, if it is functioning. MPs also need to be able to supervise these forces more effectively, which means that they must be allowed to acquire the necessary expertise and that the government should supply the information they require (on policy, funding, etc.).

In the interests of good governance and good policy, the Netherlands should do more to help bring the armed forces and police under the control of the civil and democratic authorities and to encourage the development of instruments to make them more accountable. These institutions should be professionalised to increase their focus on respect for human rights and martial law and to separate the provision of external security, provided by the army, from internal security, provided by the police. MPs

²⁷ According to the European Commission's definition, the security sector covers "all those organisations who have authority to use or order the use of force or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight."

should also be trained to supervise these forces and especially their budgets (i.e. the financial resources they are allocated).

One problem with financing military initiatives in Africa is that they are not covered by the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. However, the recently established peace fund (see section VII.3) may overcome this difficulty.

III.3 Spending on armament and on trade in arms

Between the end of the Cold War and 1997, military spending in Africa steadily declined. Underlying factors included the economic recession, smaller defence budgets due to cuts in government spending and the process of demilitarisation and demobilisation in Southern Africa, especially in South Africa. However, military spending can rapidly rise again if countries or governments feel that their security is threatened.²⁸ Since 1998, military expenditure in Africa has in fact been increasing again – by an estimated five per cent compared with 1997, to a total of USD 9.7 billion.²⁹ It is probably therefore safe to assume that the military spending of countries engaged in conflicts in West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa in particular will be relatively high. Angola's outlay in 1994, for example, came to 35% of overall government spending and that of Congo in 1998 to approximately 50%.³⁰

Conflicts and armed struggles in Africa have boosted the regional arms market. In 1998, trade in arms generated an estimated turnover of approximately USD 1.7 billion (compared with USD one billion in 1997). The arms trade in Africa is highly diverse and includes a full range of hardware from advanced modern weapons and second-hand conventional weapons systems to large quantities of small arms and ammunition. South Africa is a major arms supplier within Africa itself; the Russian Federation, China, Ukraine and Bulgaria are leading suppliers outside the continent.³¹ Most of this equipment is outdated military hardware which has become obsolete following the end of the Cold War and which suppliers are trying to dispose of to generate some return.

In 1991, the UN General Assembly agreed to establish an arms register in an effort to make arms imports and exports more transparent.³² The aim of this register is to generate more trust between the participating member states, to reduce tensions and, through the transparency created, to encourage states to impose voluntary limits on their own arms build-ups in order to reduce the chances of a destabilising proliferation of conventional weapons. On average, between 90 and 100 UN member states have supplied information to the Register each year. However, many have not, and these are primarily countries in the Middle East and Africa. In 1997, only eight African states supplied details to the arms register. In 1998, the UN Secretary General therefore called on the African countries "...to participate in the Register, in a manner that will make a

30 Sipri Yearbook, pp. 273, 274.

31 Military Balance, p. 247 and table 36.

32 Resolution 46/36 L of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 9 December 1991. UN member states must now submit a report by 30 April each year on imports and exports of tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery (from 100 mm in calibre), military aircraft and helicopters, warships (from 750 tonnes), rockets and rocket launching systems. They can also provide additional information on national arms stockpiles and the purchase of these arms from national manufacturers.

positive contribution to regional and subregional confidence-building efforts".³³ He also urged African countries to restrict their purchases of arms and ammunition to 1.5% of GNP and to freeze their defence spending for 10 years.

III.4 Combating the use of arms, including small arms

Small arms play a significant role in conflicts in Africa; it is these weapons that claim so many lives. There are two ways in which small arms are distributed throughout Africa: first of all, new weapons are exported to the continent from the industrialised world; and secondly, there is a trade in used small arms, mainly from countries where conflicts have now ended. Efforts to reduce the proliferation of small arms should therefore focus on new weapons, existing stocks of second-hand small arms and trade in both.³⁴

Ever since small arms have been included on the political agenda, many initiatives have been launched by the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and other organisations. The Netherlands is one of the countries that is committed to taking further steps, within both the UN and the European Union, to combat the spread of small arms. The EU action programme to combat the proliferation of small arms was launched at the Netherlands' instigation.

At the end of 1998, the UN Security Council adopted a series of recommendations by a panel of experts to (1) impose a moratorium on the production of small arms for, and the sale of small arms to, countries in Africa involved in an armed conflict; (2) encourage the use and standardisation of end-user declarations and (3) stamp newly manufactured small arms with an identifying mark indicating their provenance. The Security Council also called on governments to identify arms traders in order to prosecute those engaged in illegal arms dealing. Possible measures could include international regulations allowing arms dealers to be prosecuted for transactions concluded within the European Union, even if the arms themselves were not supplied from an EU member state.

In his 'Millennium Report', the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, puts forward new and existing proposals relating to the trade in, and use of, small arms in conflict areas. Mr Annan calls on the UN member states to improve the arms trade situation by increasing the transparency of arms treaties and supporting regional disarmament measures. To reduce the number of small arms in existing and potential conflict areas, Mr Annan proposes the establishment of a 'non-monetary compensation system' such as has already been successfully implemented in Mali, Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama. This system allows arms to be exchanged for equipment and tools such as sewing machines, bicycles and construction materials.³⁵

33 Military Balance, p. 247 and table 36.

34 For this and for a general discussion on small arms, see Advisory Council on International Affairs, 'Conventional Arms Control: urgent need, limited opportunities' (Advisory report no. 2, April 1998), p. 24 et seq.

35 Millennium report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 'We the peoples': The role of the United Nations in the 21st century (New York 2000), p. 52.

The UN Secretary General had previously urged arms-exporting countries to be more restrained in exporting arms to conflict areas in Africa. Attention should, he felt, be given to the role of private arms dealers supplying areas involved in conflict.³⁶ The United Nations will be organising a conference in 2001 on the illegal trade in small arms with the aim of taking further steps to combat this trade.³⁷

The UN Security Council has called on the African states to introduce regulations governing the possession of arms, including enforcement mechanisms. It also urges the imposition of import and export restrictions and states that the international community should assist this process in consultation with African states.³⁸

The OAU has also stressed the importance of coordinating the efforts of African countries to combat the proliferation of small arms, and plans to devise appropriate measures to this end.³⁹

Since October 1998, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has operated a temporary ban on the import, export and production of small arms in West Africa. The ban is to last in principle for three years, after which an evaluation will be carried out during a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS member states. Following this evaluation and the UN conference on the illegal production of, and trade in, small arms in 2001 ECOWAS can decide whether or not new initiatives are required.

One important problem in this area is that non-state actors are also major arms buyers. Canada has tried to get this issue on the political agenda by proposing a motion for an international convention aimed at banning arms agreements with non-state actors. Although various countries (Belgium, Norway) have organised conferences on the subject, the proposal has found more favour with NGOs than with governments.

The AIV has already issued general recommendations on combating the proliferation and use of small arms.⁴⁰ With regard to the African context, it again drew attention to the possibility of reducing the use of small arms by restricting the supply of ammunition. Unlike arms themselves, ammunition can only be used once. In that sense, ammunition is the fuel that keeps hostilities going. A certain level of industrial capacity is required for the production of ammunition. Since very few countries in Africa have

36 UN Secretary General, Report on Africa dealing with the proliferation of arms (New York 1998)

37 Ibid, p. 53.

38 UN Security Council, Resolution 1209, 19 November 1998.

39 Sipri Yearbook, pp. 513 – 515.

40 AIV advisory report no. 2, p. 29 et seq.

this capacity, the vast proportion of ammunition for stockpiling and for immediate use is shipped to the continent from other parts of the world.⁴¹

Against this background, the AIV has advised the Dutch government to include the question of the supply of ammunition to African countries on the agenda of the UN conference on illegal trade in small arms in 2001.

41 There are seven producers of ammunition in Africa:

Aboukir Engineering Industries	Egypt
Demel Ltd.	South Africa
uchs Electronics Ltd.	South Africa
Heliopolis Company for Engineering	Egypt
Maasara Company for Engineering	Egypt
Pretoria Metal Pressings	South Africa
Shobra Company	Egypt

Source: Terry J. Gander & Charles Q. Cutshaw (ed.), 'Jane's Ammunition Handbook 1999-2000' (8th edition, Coulsdon 1999).

IV Economic factors and armed conflicts

IV.1 Economic sources of conflict

Access to natural resources is central to the link between the economy and the potential for conflict in Africa. It involves not just the presence of valuable commodities which can be extracted relatively easily, such as diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, but also the availability of water and the shortage of production inputs, such as agricultural land in Rwanda. Additional factors which could heighten the risk of crime or of conflicts are the informalisation of economic transactions, over-dependence on the export of commodities, a low per capita income, high unemployment combined with a low level of training and the problem of large groups of young men with no prospects. This reinforces the conclusion that economic and political factors cannot be separated. The conflicts taking place in Africa are caused by various combinations of the factors mentioned above.

Africa is still a predominantly agricultural continent. For most of the population, the ability to farm land is a matter of survival. Ownership or tenure of land is therefore crucial from an economic point of view. Some Africans also ascribe a strong emotional value to living on land where their ancestors are buried. In many countries, land is still extremely unequally distributed and therefore generates strong emotions, making it a potential source of conflict. This not only applies to countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe, but also to Kenya and Rwanda. Wherever armed conflict occurs, agricultural production is often disrupted, for example because crops cannot be harvested or because farmland is lying fallow.

As part of its efforts to prevent conflict in Africa, the Netherlands should take steps to ensure that no population group within African countries is systematically excluded from the distribution and benefits of natural resources. If this appears likely to happen, then the government of the country concerned should be called to account and asked to provide systematic reports.

Little distinction is made between the public and private sectors in many African countries. The fact that many African politicians can gain a head start in business due to their ability to exploit government incentives and capital puts the liberalisation and privatisation of public services in a different light to that in the industrialised world. In a previous advisory report, the AIV emphasised the need for institutions in developing countries to monitor the orderly progress of transactions in the financial sector. It also concluded that the process of liberalisation and privatisation must be tailored to the situation of the country in question.⁴² In the light of these aspects, the AIV would like to remind the Dutch government of these earlier recommendations.

⁴² Addison, 'Underdevelopment, Transition and Reconstruction'. See also Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), 'Key lessons from the financial crises of 1997 and 1998, May 2000', (Report no. 14), p. 28.

IV.2 Financing armed conflicts

The exploitation of commodities and other natural resources plays a crucial role in financing participation in conflicts in Africa, as do the interests of the multinationals involved in the extraction or commercial exploitation of these resources.⁴³ In the case of precious metals and minerals, and to some extent of drugs and arms, traders and the processing industry are often directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. For example, when diamonds are smuggled out of conflict regions such as Sierra Leone or Angola, the proceeds from their sale benefit the protagonists involved in these conflicts. As a result, the United Kingdom now demands valid certificates of origin before releasing diamonds for processing. The De Beers company has recently decided to suspend the purchase of diamonds on the open market and to redouble its efforts to refine the technology it uses to trace the origin of the stones. The World Diamond Congress held in July 2000 agreed in principle that only diamonds with a certificate of origin could be traded in future. Of particular importance is the fact that the G8 nations, which account for the lion's share of the global trade in diamonds, acknowledge the urgency of the problem of the illegal trade and have pledged their commitment to assisting the regional enforcement of laws and regulations in Africa and to certifying the origin of diamonds.⁴⁴ The UN Security Council has issued a presidential declaration asking the Secretary General to appoint a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of commodities from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the role this may be playing in the ongoing conflict there.⁴⁵ De Beers has also offered to share its know-how with the UN to help combat the illegal trade in diamonds.

The Netherlands should continue to actively support recent initiatives to stamp out the illegal trade in diamonds and to improve the quality of certificates of origin. In doing so, it should exploit the involvement of civil society in Africa, and in particular the experience of one or two NGOs in this area, such as the European NGO network Fatal Attraction.

Africa plays a major role in the illegal trafficking of hard drugs, such as heroin, crack and cocaine. Thirty per cent of the heroin confiscated in Europe and the United States is shipped to the West via Africa. It is relatively easy for this trade to be conducted through Africa because ports and airports in many African countries do not have enough customs and police officers. Both the drugs themselves and the revenue from their sale are contributory factors in the escalating violence in Africa. While there is no proof that African governments are cooperating with drug dealers, the existing corruption in many of these regimes does make it easier for drug-runners to move about the continent unpunished. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, sees a specifically targeted international response as the only solution.⁴⁶

43 Report of the panel of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA, UN Security Council, S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

44 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit Meeting 2000, G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, pp. 5-6.

45 S/PRST/2000/20.

46 UN Secretary General, Progress report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 1999, p. 18.

The action plan agreed at the summit between the European Union and African countries in Cairo also recognises the seriousness of the problems caused by drug abuse and drug trafficking, and points out that the poor socioeconomic conditions in Africa are largely to blame.

Since 1997, the European Commission has been operating a drugs programme in West Africa aimed at helping 16 participating African states to further develop their national action plans to combat the trade in, and use of, drugs.⁴⁷

The AIV believes that the Netherlands should continue to support international and African efforts to combat trade in hard drugs.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

V The social context of conflicts and conflict resolution

Existing structures offering social security and welfare in Africa are under pressure, not only from conflicts and armed struggles but also from migration, Aids, the 'pull' which armed conflicts exert on young men in Africa, the negative consequences of armed conflicts on the status of women and the difficulties associated with reconciliation and reconstruction. These issues are discussed below.

V.1 Migration

Migration covers urbanisation (internal migration), the departure of labour migrants from their countries of origin (emigration) and finally the enforced migration of refugees and displaced persons (immigration and emigration). Large-scale migration causes instability, especially when it is enforced. The movement of people from rural to urban areas is steadily growing. The level of urbanisation is now higher than 40% of the population in more than 20 African countries, and by 2010-2015, half of the African population will probably be living in cities. This migration is precipitating a social and demographic revolution. The belief that this will lead to an increase in violence and crime appears to be justified. Employment and food security problems are also an issue. While it is not possible to influence such migration patterns, attention can at least be given to the problems attendant on such extensive migrations from rural to urban areas. It is important for the Dutch development cooperation programme to continue to focus on this trend.

The AIV feels that the Netherlands' efforts to help alleviate the problems caused by migration should not be restricted to national level, central governments or the major cities, but that they should also target smaller towns and rural areas where migrants seek refuge - and those areas which people are leaving. More attention should be given in development programmes to the creation of jobs in new emerging cities and non-agricultural sectors.

V.2 Aids

The spread of HIV and the consequences of Aids are having severe demographic repercussions, and this can in turn harbour the seeds of conflict. In many countries, the disease has reduced life expectancy to below 40. Seventy per cent of the world's Aids sufferers currently live in Africa. Yet the Aids problem is not merely a health issue. Aids also affects economic development and food production. Moreover, it threatens a country's political and administrative well-being, given that many Aids sufferers are members of the government, the judiciary and the armed forces.⁴⁸ The disease also claims many victims among the teaching profession. Since 1987, Dutch international policy on Aids has largely been formulated within the framework of development cooperation. Approximately USD 250 million has been spent on bilateral and multilateral activities to combat the disease.⁴⁹ In 2000, the Netherlands allocated around USD 40

47 United Nations Security Council, Press Release Security Council/ 6781. Source: www.vn.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html.

48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aids Update, January 2000.

million to the 'International Aids Vaccine Initiative'. The Netherlands is the second biggest donor in the fight against Aids in developing countries, after the United States.

In an open debate held in January 2000, the UN Security Council discussed the effect of Aids on security and stability in Africa. According to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the impact of the disease on peace and security in Africa can be compared to the destructive effects of war. The violence and the resulting displacement of large numbers of people in Africa – soldiers, rebels and refugees alike – fuels the epidemic still further. Some refugees run a higher risk of infection due to their weakened constitution. The level of infection among women in refugee camps is substantially higher than it is among women outside.

The fact that in many countries, a high proportion of members of the armed forces are HIV positive also has a knock-on effect on security and stability in Africa. Since the United Nations does not in principle wish to include soldiers with HIV in peacekeeping forces, Aids could ultimately also reduce the deployability of African soldiers in peace operations. Recently, the United States asked the Security Council to brief all UN peacekeeping troops (some 35,000 worldwide) on sexually transmittable diseases and to screen UN soldiers for Aids.⁵⁰ The United Nations has since compiled an awareness programme explaining the dangers of Aids and how to avoid infection, aimed at troops taking part in peace operations. The medical handbooks for UN service personnel also include chapters on the prevention and treatment of Aids. It should however be noted that in terms of participation in UN peace operations, responsibility for combating the spread of Aids among military personnel lies with the member states themselves.

In addition to supporting these general measures to combat Aids, the Netherlands must also continue to call for greater openness on sexuality and Aids, including within the armed forces of African countries. The information that is already being disseminated to military personnel in this context by the DPKO, UNFPA and UNAIDS, among others, should be encouraged and supported by the Netherlands.

One tragic consequence of the Aids epidemic is the many orphans it creates. The reception and care of these orphans places a heavy burden on society. The social disruption and the lasting emotional and psychological damage associated with this phenomenon can put further pressure on already precarious social stability.

The AIV recommends that the Netherlands strengthen its various existing care mechanisms for Aids sufferers and their relatives (extended families, child-headed families, orphanages) through a sector-wide approach. Job creation programmes (see section V.1) should take account of the care that participants must – or have had to – give to relatives with Aids.

V.3 Youth and violence

In almost all African countries, half of the population is below the age of 18, and in some countries even below 15. The vast majority of youngsters are affected by poverty, family health problems (notably Aids) and seriously inadequate public provisions, notably education. Yet the aspirations of young Africans are generally high, influenced partly by spending patterns in the industrialised world.

⁵⁰ Aids Counselling for Peacekeepers Urged, Washington Post, 7 July 2000, p. A18.
Source: www.washingtonpost.com.

In countries and regions affected by widespread violence, young men in particular are caught in a vicious circle⁵¹. Having grown up in a culture of violence, they naturally turn to violence as the only means available to them. Their deep frustration concerning the future, in which there seems to be no hope of a better life, combined with the extensive availability of weapons is seen as a way of obtaining a ready income and fulfilling their private ambitions, as well as improving their status. It matters little to these youngsters whether they are fighting for the state, a militia headed by a 'warlord', a criminal organisation or a succession of all three. Their use of brutal and merciless violence spreads terror among the rest of the population and results in trauma, including for the young perpetrators themselves; moreover, it stifles at the outset any chance of systematic economic, social and political development.

Adolescent boys and children are increasingly forced to participate in armed conflicts throughout the world, including in Africa, for example in Mozambique, Liberia, Uganda and Sierra Leone. These recruits tend to be marginalised youngsters from villages and urban slums who have become detached from their social contexts and the values they embrace, sometimes as a result of the conflict itself. They often literally have nothing to lose, make few demands and can be turned into disciplined, dedicated and pliable soldiers. Organisations such as the 'Lord's Army' in Uganda or the 'Revolutionary United Front' in Sierra Leone give them weapons and supply them with drugs which remove all restraints and inhibitions. Some armies or militias even resort to bizarre and cruel initiation rites which in turn persuade these youngsters to commit barbaric acts during the armed conflict. Many of them are orphans and one of their motives for becoming involved in the armed struggle is to avenge the death of their parents.

The AIV recommends that the Netherlands give high priority to the growing number of marginalised youngsters in Africa, given that they are particularly susceptible to recruitment by militias and criminal organisations. The AIV believes that the Netherlands should do more to help generate employment for young people in Africa, with a view to offering them an alternative to participation in armed conflicts and the prospect of a brighter future. Successful examples of initiatives co-funded by the Netherlands are the Joint Enrichment Project and the Youth Development Network in South Africa, which were established by local churches to organise employment and training activities for marginalised youngsters.

In early 2000, the UN working party approved an optional protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child concerning the deployment of children in armed conflicts. The aim of the protocol was to oppose the participation of children in such conflicts. States which sign the protocol undertake to apply a minimum age of 18 for participation in armed conflicts (instead of 15, as specified in the Convention). These countries are also obliged to ban non-state militias from recruiting troops below the age of 18, and to prosecute any violations of this ban. The Netherlands signed the optional protocol in the margins of the UN Millennium Summit, and there are no formal obstacles to its ratification.

In the past, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R) programmes tended to be introduced into post-conflict situations. Now, however, these programmes are also used as a means of preventing conflicts and escalating crime.⁵²

51 El-Kenz, A., Youth and Violence, in: Africa Now, S. Ellis (ed.)

52 Mason, P., 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programs as a Means to Prevent Deadly Conflict', in: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Letter 15, Security Sector Reform, 2000.

The Netherlands should therefore continue to cofinance DD&R programme specifically targeted at youngsters in Africa, as an instrument for conflict prevention and in countries affected by serious crime.

V.4 Gender and security

The relationship between 'gender' (relations between men and women), security and conflict can be approached from three angles. First of all, conflict and violence can take on a different form and meaning for men and women. Second, women can play a positive role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution and in the rebuilding of communities ravaged by war.⁵³ Third, women can acquire a more autonomous economic and social status during a conflict.

- 1) The vulnerable status of women is reflected, *inter alia*, in the fact that the vast majority of the inhabitants of refugee camps are women and children. Although women are generally regarded as being in need of protection, during conflicts their rights are often seriously violated, for example by systematic rape and sexual abuse, torture and enforced prostitution.⁵⁴ Rape is increasingly used as a way of punishing, intimidating and humiliating both men and women from an enemy group. Since in many African countries the sexual purity of a woman is of primary importance, the sexual violation of a woman can be interpreted as an attack on an entire community. Hostile groups use rape to suggest that the men are unable to protect their women.⁵⁵
- 2) The role of women in conflicts and conflict resolution was one of the key issues discussed at the Fourth World Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995.⁵⁶ African women traditionally enjoy a strong position in their local communities and are thus in a position to identify conflicts at an early stage. The Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP) is therefore calling for women to be trained in 'monitoring and early warning'. In January 1996, the international conference 'War and Peace: For Men Only?' recommended that violations of women's rights should be an indicator in conflict 'early warning' systems and that women should be included in monitoring teams.⁵⁷ Women can also play a significant role in conflict resolution and in trauma counselling at local level.
- 3) Women recognise that the cessation of hostilities will affect their social status. Increasing efforts are therefore being made to place sexual equality on the political agenda and to demand greater participation for women in the political system. Many national liberation movements include equal rights and the liberation of women on

53 Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, 'Women at the Peace Table, Making a Difference', UNIFEM, New York, 2000.

54 Amnesty International, 'Sierra Leone: Rape and other forms of sexual violence must be stopped', June 2000.

55 Pax Christi, 'We have to sit down; Women, war and peace in southern Sudan', 1998, p. 26.

56 Ibid, p. 26.

57 Ibid, p. 78.

their political agendas. They use this to encourage the participation of women in conflicts and to generate expectations concerning autonomy, equality and justice.⁵⁸

In the Africa memorandum, 'gender' is only mentioned in a sub-clause as an issue to which the Netherlands will continue to provide "substantial wide-ranging support".

In view of these developments, the AIV feels that the Netherlands should continue to give explicit and systematic attention in its Africa policy to the role of gender in relation to questions of security and stability. This means, among other things, that the Netherlands should continue to assist the prosecution and sentencing of those who are guilty of rape, as is currently being done by the Rwanda tribunal. A larger financial allocation should therefore be earmarked for UNIFEM, and local 'gender' and security projects should be funded.

V.5 Reconciliation

The signing of a formal treaty which ideally brings hostilities to an end marks the start of the post-conflict phase, highlighting reconstruction and reconciliation. The bridging of economic, social and political differences at this stage is crucial. One possibility is to exploit common traditions and institutions for conflict mediation.⁵⁹ Attempts at reconciliation must be supported at all levels, including by local leaders, civil society and grass roots organisations.⁶⁰

The AIV believes that the Netherlands can contribute to peace processes in Africa by supporting socially embedded reconciliation campaigns and by involving civil society in these campaigns. The emphasis must lie on encouraging the population and local organisations to accept the peace treaties with a view to restoring peace and social cohesion. Women's organisations should be included in these efforts.

58 Sørensen, B., 'Women and post-conflict resolution', Geneva 1998, p. 6.

59 Kessel, I. van, 'Ten years after: African nationalism and the re-traditionalization of South Africa', paper for a seminar of the African Studies Centre, Leiden 2000.

60 Lederach, J.P., 'Just Peace – The Challenge of the 21st Century', in: People Building Peace, 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, Utrecht 1999, p. 29; Spears, I.S., Understanding inclusive peace agreements in Africa: the problems of sharing power, in: Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 2000.

VI Human rights and security

VI.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

In 1979, the OAU drew up the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. This initiative came at a time when human rights violations were widespread in Africa. The preamble to the Charter calls for an end to colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and 'aggressive foreign military bases'.⁶¹ The Charter was adopted by the OAU in 1981 and took effect in 1986.

By 2001, all the OAU member states had ratified the Charter, which guarantees not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights. It also bans slavery and cruel and inhuman treatment. Another of its characteristics is the inclusion of collective rights, such as the right of peoples to political and economic self-determination, to peace and security, to development and to a livable environment. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights monitors compliance with the Charter. States, individuals and NGOs can report violations of the rights of the Charter to the Commission.

Drafting, enforcing and improving the effectiveness of the Charter is a lengthy process whose political relevance lies in the setting of standards and in the ability to prosecute human rights abuses within an international forum. In addition to the right of complaint, the reporting obligation for states is a means by which governments can be made to comply with the Charter. An African Court of Human Rights will be established within the foreseeable future. An appropriate statute to this effect was appended to the Charter as a protocol in 1998 and is now awaiting the required number of ratifications.

One difficulty for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is that several members of the Commission also hold government posts in their own country, which may lead to a conflict of interests. However, states are frequently reminded of their obligations to respect human rights. The Commission also has the authority to investigate possible human rights violations.

The Commission is authorised to interpret the Charter at the request of states, international organisations, OAU bodies and NGOs recognised by the OAU. The latter have observer status, and can table agenda items and submit complaints on behalf of individuals or groups. NGO working groups have also been set up; they have encouraged the nomination of women to the Commission and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on summary and arbitrary executions.⁶² In view of these developments and of the key role played by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in supervising compliance with the rights contained in the Charter, the legal and political significance of the Commission has grown in recent years.

⁶¹ Ankumah, E.A., *The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, practice and procedures*, The Hague 1996, p. 7.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 187.

The AIV therefore recommends that the Netherlands provide financial support to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in a way that boosts the Commission's independence. Due to the important role played by the Commission, such support will promote the further development, refinement and enforcement of the African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights.

VI.2 The legal system and human rights

The progress of democratisation is making reform of the legal system and constitution necessary. Such reforms could include legal certainty (legislation and law enforcement) and a constitution that provides a legislative and normative framework for human rights.

Protecting human rights is also important for economic growth. An independent and properly functioning judiciary and legal profession are essential to this. One problem is that in many African countries, the judiciary and lawyers cannot operate with a sufficient degree of independence.

In the interests of good governance and good policy, the Netherlands should devote more attention to the need for an independent judiciary and legal profession to promote the stability, security and development of African countries.

The development of a legal system based on the 'rule of law' should also go hand in hand with 'civic education'. In other words, the public should be made aware of their rights and obligations, especially once an armed conflict is over. Awareness-raising campaigns will have little impact if the perpetrators of human rights violations are allowed to go free. More generally, immunity from punishment also has negative effects on reconstruction. In each case, a choice will have to be made between the need to prosecute and the need to preserve short term social and political stability. One interesting model in this context is South Africa's Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, which has played a key role in bridging differences following the dismantling of apartheid.

The Netherlands should support campaigns to increase awareness of the need to respect human rights. The rights of refugees and of displaced persons deserve special protection.

VI.3 National commissions on human rights

In various African countries – as in other parts of the world – national human rights commissions play a major role in the drafting of legislation and policy to ensure respect for human rights at national and local level.⁶³ They also handle simple complaints and arbitration procedures. Finally, they provide training and education on human rights. Such commissions exist in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. The 1991 'Paris Principles' contain a list of some of the conditions and responsibilities which must be met by national institutions and commissions for the protection

⁶³ Secretary General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, A/54/336, 1999. Source: www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoc.

and promotion of human rights.⁶⁴ Institutes and commissions which do not at least satisfy the conditions specified in these principles will not be recognised as such by the international community. The activities of national commissions are governed by their own national priorities. These human rights commissions can differ from country to country: in some countries they are appointed by the government, while in others they are wholly or partially non-governmental. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is helping to set up national human rights commissions in African countries where they do not yet exist.⁶⁵

The Netherlands should closely monitor the activities of the various African national commissions for the promotion and protection of human rights and, if requested to do so, should provide support to those commissions which are sufficiently independent and satisfy the Paris Principles.

64 See HR Res. 1992/54, 3 March 1992.

65 In July 1998, The Second Conference of African National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was held in Durban, South Africa. It was attended by 16 African national institutions.

VII International political commitment to security and stability in Africa

VII.1 General outline

The United Nations' Millennium Declaration devotes special attention to Africa. It calls on the international community to meet the needs and requirements of people in Africa and as such tries to reflect international commitment to Africa.

International political involvement in efforts to manage conflicts in Africa has changed since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the departure of Russian and Cuban troops from Southern Africa has led the United States to rethink its strategy on Africa. A half-hearted attempt by the USA, begun under former president George Bush Senior, to establish a 'New World Order' in Africa came to grief in the labyrinth of the conflict in Somalia. Although former colonial powers such as Britain, France, Portugal and Germany are not renouncing their historic ties, these ties do not provide a strong enough foundation for a coherent, coordinated policy on Africa. Despite efforts to promote political stability and better living conditions, many donors still over-prioritise goals such as political influence and access to markets, mineral wealth and other resources. As a result, the UN has found it difficult in recent years to get peace operations in Africa off the ground, especially when they have been risky. Dutch participation in UNMEE (the peace operation to enforce the cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea) appears to be the exception to the rule.⁶⁶

In 1997, the United States launched two initiatives for Africa. The first was the 'Partnership for economic growth and opportunity in Africa' initiative, which helps US companies to develop activities in Africa. The second was the 'African crisis response center', which was established to provide training to the armed forces in African countries in order to increase their deployability throughout the continent.

In July 2000, the G8 member states adopted a resolution announcing a series of conflict prevention measures. These measures are: to curb the uncontrolled trade in small arms, to remove potential sources of conflict through development policy, to halt the illegal trade in diamonds (most of which are mined in conflict areas in Africa), to alleviate the effects of armed conflicts on children (including measures to reduce the participation of children as combatants) and to highlight the role of an international police force (CIVPOL) as a key element in conflict prevention. It is particularly important for Africa to develop a 'culture of prevention', and the G8 countries want to assist this process.⁶⁷

Naturally enough, African countries have also established their own multilateral organisations, notably the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which aims to cover the continent as a whole. Other organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and

66 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

67 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit Meeting 2000, G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, Okinawa 2000. Source: www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/documents/html/initiative.html.

the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD; an intergovernmental organisation of seven countries in the Horn of Africa aimed at coordinating development in the region) are primarily geared towards specific regions in Africa. The OAU is increasingly endorsing democratic principles and respect for fundamental human rights. At its summit in 2000, the organisation adopted the principle that leaders who came to power through the use of violence would no longer be treated as equals by the assembly of elected heads of state. The OAU is also gradually prioritising regional stability and security over national sovereignty, and has taken steps to prevent the further escalation of specific conflicts, such as those in Gabon and in Guinea-Bissau, with mixed success. The Netherlands is co-funding efforts to strengthen the OAU's Conflict Prevention Mechanism. Despite this, the organisation still lacks the capacity to adequately address all current or potential conflicts. In early 2000, the Netherlands joined the Friends of the OAU and is using its membership of this forum to assist the organisation's reform.

VII.2 European Union policy on Africa

The geographical proximity of the European Union to Africa and the historical ties between individual EU member states and countries and regions in Africa present both sides with a shared responsibility. A summit of heads of state and government of the EU member states and Africa was held on 3 and 4 April 2000. The closing declaration and action plan covered many issues, yet few concrete results have been achieved so far. The delegates agreed to hold a new summit in 2003.

EU policy on Africa has traditionally concentrated on development cooperation, centring on the Lomé Convention, which has governed relations between the European Union and 71 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) for the past 25 years. The Convention, which was recently replaced by the Cotonou Convention (signed on 23 June 2000), contained a clause allowing for its suspension or for a reduction in aid to countries where human rights had been violated or democracy had been undermined. This provision has been used in respect of five African countries: Niger, Guinea-Bissau, the Comoros, Togo and Ivory Coast.⁶⁸

The Lomé Convention focused solely on the liberalisation of trade within the WTO (previously the GATT). By contrast, the Cotonou Convention envisages long-term EU involvement in Africa (2000-2020), for which the European Union has set aside EUR 14.3 billion for the first five years. One of the new Convention's aims is the gradual integration of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) into the global economy, with special rules for the least developed countries. Cotonou seeks to further consolidate cooperation between the European Union member states and the ACP. In addition to political dialogue concerning human rights, democratisation and the constitutional state – all of which was also possible under Lomé – the signatories can now also discuss conflict prevention, organised crime, drugs, the arms trade and the repatriation of illegal immigrants. Civil society and the private sector are also specifically included in these discussions.⁶⁹

68 Arts, K., *Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of Lomé*, Amsterdam Free University, Amsterdam 2000.

69 International Law Association, *London Conference (2000)*, London 2000, p. 7; Actes préparatoires communautaires no. 500PC1359S (europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/com/dat/2000/fr_500PC1359S.html).

Despite this, there are still questions concerning the implementation of the Cotonou Convention and of EU aid in general. In September 2000, the EU General Affairs Council reached agreement on setting priorities, improving coordination and drafting a 'sun-set' clause governing proposed expenditure (which will automatically be withdrawn after a specific period).⁷⁰

In addition to coordinating expenditure on aid, the European Union member states must coordinate their respective policies on Africa. The Netherlands has always set great store by a closely coordinated policy; in May 2000, for example, it included 'conflicts in Africa' on the agenda of the General Affairs Council. The main topic of discussion was the situation in the Great Lakes region. The EU member states agreed to support the idea of a conference on peace, security, democracy and development, to be organised jointly by the OAU and the UN. It was decided that preparations for the conference could begin as soon as the key provisions of the Lusaka Treaty (drawn up to suspend the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo) had been implemented. The ministers also agreed to work with the treaty signatories, other donors, the World Bank and interested African countries to seek ways of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating the former combatants. The EU is willing to provide financial assistance for the repatriation of refugees and for the recovery of the most severely affected regions, notably Kivu.

Similarly, EU member states should be able to call each other to account more frequently concerning their respective policies on Africa. So far, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has been used mainly for the exchange of information on aspects such as participation in peace operations in Africa and arms supplies. Such exchanges of information could be used in the future to coordinate policy.

Following the genocide in Rwanda, the WEU developed activities aimed at increasing peacekeeping opportunities in African countries. In particular, it focused on:

- issuing information and advice to African countries on mine clearance;
- providing military training and advice to strengthen local peacekeeping capacity;
- using the WEU satellite centre to help the OAU with crisis monitoring and planning.

Since many of the WEU's activities will end in 2001 and be transferred to the European Union, it is important that support for African countries does not lose momentum. The Netherlands should ensure that when the WEU activities come to a close, those activities pertaining to Africa which are found to have had positive results should be transferred to the EU.

VII.3 Peacekeeping in Africa

The Netherlands' contribution of more than 1,000 troops to the UNMEE peacekeeping force in the border region between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a visible sign of its commitment to security and stability in Africa. The Dutch military presence consists of a strengthened Marine Corps infantry battalion with logistical support from the army. The Netherlands Air Force has also sent out a helicopter squadron. The aim of this UN peacekeeping operation is to monitor the ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea in

⁷⁰ Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of Representatives of the States General, containing the annotated agenda of the General Affairs Council of 9-10 October (3 October 2000), p. 2.

order to create the right conditions for a political settlement between the two countries in their border dispute. The Netherlands will work closely with Canada during the operation. The Dutch troops are due to spend six months in Africa. The Dutch government justifies its participation in UNMEE on the basis of Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution (upholding the international rule of law). It maintains that the peace operation is promoting stability in the Horn of Africa, and cites the severity of the humanitarian situation there, the (declining) stream of refugees, the Netherlands' ties with Ethiopia and Eritrea and its commitment to a viable United Nations. All in all, the Dutch government concludes that participation in UNMEE is in the Netherlands' interest.⁷¹ The House of Representatives endorses this view.

The Dutch troops in Africa are also providing chiefly logistical and other support, including anti-mine and mine clearance operations as part of peacekeeping and other operations in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda and elsewhere. The Dutch contribution to UNMEE has led the government to reverse its decision to send a military detachment to MINURSO in the Western Sahara.⁷²

Another example of the Netherlands' contribution to peacekeeping in Africa is the 'Gabon 2000' operation, which emerged out of the 1994 French cooperation programme with 18 African countries, 'Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix' (RECAMP), and in which the Dutch government provided a water purification installation together with operating personnel. In 1999, an exercise called 'Blue Crane' was held in South Africa, to which the Netherlands contributed NLG 500,000. An identical sum was pledged to the ECOMOG Interposition Force. The Netherlands is also providing transport capacity and other logistical support to the peace mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and is helping to train African officers to become UN observers. Some 15 are currently trained each year, and steps are being taken to increase this number to 32. Other European Union member states are also training service personnel from African countries for similar duties. The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, has suggested combining these separate initiatives.

In its 2001 budget, the Dutch government earmarked funding for the Koenders motion, which was brought forward during the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2000 and which proposed the establishment of a peace fund. This fund can be used to cofinance peace dialogues and peacekeeping operations by developing countries. The peace fund will also be used to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of developing countries. It will mainly provide incidental contributions to short-term activities. These might include training and instruction and the provision of teaching materials on peace operations (such as UNMO for African service personnel) in the Netherlands or Africa; the supply, co-funding, distribution and/or transportation of personnel and equipment; the confiscation and collection of small arms; the cofinancing of peace conferences and other fora; short-term research into conflicts and conflict prevention; the reform of the defence sector; the funding of participation by foreign experts in

71 Letter from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence to the President of the House of Representatives of the States General concerning Dutch participation in UNMEE (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), 9 October 2000.

72 United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. This operation aims to create a secure and stable environment for a census and a referendum.

peace operations (such as mine clearance specialists); and measures to enable developing countries to take part in non-UN peace operations via bilateral contributions or payments into a trust fund. The peace fund will be allocated an annual NLG 15 million.

In order to increase the capacity of African countries to promote security and stability throughout the continent, the Netherlands should continue to provide support for African regional initiatives through the transfer of knowledge, experience and capital. This can be done either through an extra allocation to the peace fund or via the regular flow of development aid.

VII.4 An OSCE for Africa?

The idea of a conference for African states on security, stability and development, modelled on the OSCE, has been around for some time. As early as 1991, the former Nigerian head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, put forward a proposal for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). This proposal advocated the creation of a framework that would encourage states to treat their citizens with respect, for example by offering them physical protection when exercising their democratic rights and by upholding their basic rights and freedoms.⁷³ The AIV believes that it is less a matter of replicating the OSCE model – which is in any case based on the European political constellation – than of introducing the underlying perceptions and ideas of the OSCE into the political discussion in Africa. It is not so much a question of adopting the form, but rather of adopting the content. The OAU is the obvious organisation with which to engage in a dialogue on this issue.

The Netherlands has elected to be Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE presidency in 2003. It should use this opportunity to investigate whether a dialogue between the OSCE and the OAU, as described above, can be set in motion.

When it becomes Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the Netherlands should launch initiatives aimed at introducing the principles and ideas underlying the OSCE into the political discussion in Africa. With this in mind, it should seek to promote a dialogue between the OSCE and OAU.

VII.5 Dutch bilateral and multilateral involvement in Africa

In addition to what has already been said in the previous sections about the Netherlands' involvement in Africa, one or two elements need to be discussed in greater detail.

In her letter to the House of Representatives concerning cooperation with the development ministers of Norway, the United Kingdom and Germany, Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation Eveline Herfkens argues that the essence of cooperation lies in the explicit desire to use membership of key fora to influence the international development agenda.⁷⁴ Measures to boost effectiveness through improved results in the field lie at

73 Francis M. Deng, *The fate of the state and the international system, with special reference to Africa*, The Brookings Institution, Washington; F. Deng, S. Kimaro et al, *Sovereignty as Responsibility, Conflict Management in Africa*, Washington, 1996, e.g. pp. 15-16, 58.

74 Letter from the Minister for Development Cooperation to the House of Representatives of the States General, SC-133/00, The Hague, 29 August 2000.

the heart of these endeavours. One of the areas of cooperation is conflict prevention.

The AIV feels that the chief way in which the Netherlands can pursue an effective policy on security and stability in Africa is through multilateral fora such as the UN and the European Union. Outside these fora, the Netherlands can try to work with like-minded donor countries in consortia and coalitions. However, the AIV does not see the combining of forces with like-minded donors as a genuine alternative to existing multilateral fora, but rather as a springboard for the forging of coalitions within the United Nations and the European Union.

Despite the fact that it is increasingly focused on institutional, political and administrative issues, development cooperation cannot tackle all the risk factors surrounding security and stability in Africa covered in this advisory report. For this reason, more and more areas of Dutch government policy are including Africa in their brief. The armed forces are being committed to military involvement there, provided such intervention is politically justified. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must increasingly coordinate its diplomatic activities in Africa with other spheres of policy. The Ministries of Economic Affairs and of Agriculture will give substantial weight to the interests of the Dutch economy and trade in Africa. Other priority areas will be the influence of NGOs and the private sector, and the fight against illegal arms dealing and diamond smuggling. The desirability of proper cohesion and coordination between these policy areas and international activities is beyond question, yet whether it is possible to achieve this – in other words, whether all these wide-ranging goals can be linked by a common denominator - is another matter. However, the AIV feels that the Dutch government should at least make a start on this by trying to achieve cohesion in the formulation and implementation of policy, initially between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Defence. The discussions the government has broached both nationally and internationally, for example on how to combat the dumping of goods in Africa and how to open up markets to agricultural produce from Africa, show that it is already committed to this.

The AIV recommends a coherence test or report to encourage the other relevant ministries to become more aware of the importance of poverty reduction in Africa. An effective policy for the least developed countries in Africa will benefit from an understanding of which elements of the policies of the aforementioned ministries improve conditions for the poorest of the poor, and which do not. A coherence test or report can help to chart the consequences of policy, avoid its negative effects and boost its effectiveness for the least developed countries.

VIII Summary and recommendations

On 31 January 2000, the Advisory Council on International Affairs was asked to produce an advisory report on ways to promote peace and stability in Africa, which is one of the key objectives of the Netherlands' Africa policy memorandum.

The sheer size of the African continent and the complexity of the problems surrounding security and stability means that an effective solution cannot be limited to a single policy area. While it would be naïve to assume that the goals of ministries that focus primarily on domestic Dutch interests, such as the Ministries of Economic Affairs and of Agriculture, can always be harmonised with international activities, efforts must nevertheless be made to achieve greater coherence. The AIV feels that the government should at least make a start by trying to achieve cohesion in the formulation and implementation of policy, initially between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Defence.

The AIV recommends a coherence test or report to encourage the other relevant ministries to become more aware of the importance of poverty reduction in Africa. An effective policy for the least developed countries in Africa will benefit from an understanding of which elements of the policies of the aforementioned ministries improve conditions for the poorest of the poor, and which do not. A coherence test or report can help to chart the consequences of such policy, avoid its negative effects and boost its effectiveness for the least developed countries.

It would also be unrealistic to expect the Netherlands to provide an effective answer to the immense problems confronting Africa, especially since its existing development cooperation policy in this sphere is directed mainly at countries that are already pursuing good governance and good policy. The recommendations formulated in this advisory report therefore relate primarily to standpoints and views that the Netherlands can put forward in a multilateral context, unless it is expressly indicated that the Dutch government can perform the activity concerned bilaterally.

In this advisory report, the AIV calls for continued international, European and Dutch involvement in Africa, partly in the light of the various links which the Netherlands and Europe have with the continent. The report should be seen as a plea for concentrated efforts by the Netherlands in these multilateral fora to make Africa more secure and more stable.

Most of the 27 major conflicts that took place throughout the world in 1999 occurred in Africa. Around a fifth of the African population lives in countries affected by armed conflicts. One in every 150 Africans is a refugee. The AIV acknowledges that state-building in Africa is an important prerequisite for the growth of security and stability. A weak central government can make conflicts more likely. In Africa, conflicts and violence are sparked off by various combinations of political, economic, socio-cultural and other factors. The breakdown of security and stability is also linked to problems of food security, poverty, economic decline, scarcity of natural resources, environmental degradation, social inequality and human rights violations.

The causes of the conflicts and oppositions within and between African countries are extremely wide-ranging. Armed conflicts and wars are difficult to bring under control

once they have started: even when a conflict is over, there is a significant risk of a new conflict flaring up near the site of a previous struggle.

The AIV believes that one of the main causes of conflict is the weakness of state structures in Africa. Despite enjoying formal recognition by the international community, many African states have no effective and recognised authority over their own populations and lack properly functioning institutions. In the worst cases, this leads to the collapse of centralised structures, creating what are known as 'failed states'. In such cases, Africans can transfer their primary loyalty to their own ethnic, religious or cultural grouping, with all the associated risks of polarisation and political nepotism.

In countries where civil society is weak but the 'failing state' has not yet led to extreme situations, political parties function less as instruments of parliamentary supervision than as vehicles for the acquisition and exercise of power. Democratisation is therefore about more than simply holding elections. Yet despite this, during the 1990s, donors spent most of their funding to promote democracy on sending international observers to elections.

The AIV believes that the Dutch government should place the monitoring of elections more in the broader context of support for democratisation processes in Africa. The basic aim should continue to be to ensure that civil and political rights in the country concerned are adequately respected and that the security situation allows elections to be held. In addition to election monitoring in the strict sense, the AIV also recommends that the Dutch government provide support for the technical and logistical preparation and implementation of elections. This could include help with the deployment of local observers, the supply of ballot papers and ballot boxes, the distribution of information to voters, and the training of staff at polling stations.

Support for, and involvement in, preparations for elections are a more effective way of evaluating how they are run and of identifying electoral malpractice early on. The experience gained in providing support for elections can be deepened by appointing an official working party to supervise this assistance. The AIV also recommends that the Minister for Development Cooperation submit periodic reports to Parliament and evaluation of Dutch involvement in election monitoring. These evaluations should be included in reports to the House. Such professionalisation of the election monitoring process ties in well with the European Union's proposals to improve the planning and coordination of election monitoring activities by the member states.

In view of this lengthy process, the key aim of which, according to the AIV, is to help build democratic institutions which are firmly embedded in African civil society, the AIV recommends great caution when considering the provision of financial support to political parties. Funding can perhaps instead be given to the International Parliamentary Union to help it to create the right circumstances for political parties in African countries to call their governments to account through the parliamentary process.

Support for Security Sector Reform is a key aspect of efforts to strengthen parliamentary democracy and institution-building, although the policy is still in its infancy. In their bilateral relationships with African countries, donors must try to help the military and police forces to be more receptive to outside control, primarily by the parliament of the country concerned. MPs also need to be able to conduct better and more effective supervision.

In the interests of good governance and good policy, the Netherlands should do more to help bring the armed forces and police under the control of the civil and democratic authorities and to encourage the development of instruments to make them more accountable. These institutions should be professionalised to increase their focus on respect for human rights and martial law and to separate the provision of external security, provided by the army, from internal security, provided by the police. MPs should also be trained to supervise these forces, especially their budgets (i.e. their financial allocations).

Small arms play a significant role in conflicts in Africa; it is these weapons that claim so many lives and make it possible for children to take part in the armed struggle. The Netherlands is committed to taking further steps, within the UN and the European Union to combat the spread of small arms. The EU action programme to combat the proliferation of small arms was launched at the Netherlands' instigation. The United Nations will be organising a conference in 2001 on the illegal production and trade in small arms. Following this conference and the evaluation, during the same year, of a three-year ban by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the production, import and export of small arms, a decision can be made to see whether new initiatives are required.

The AIV has already issued general recommendations on combating the proliferation and use of small arms. With regard to the African context, it has advised the Dutch government to include the question of controlling the trade in, and supply of, ammunition to African countries on the agenda of the UN conference on illegal production of small arms in 2001.

Various combinations of economic factors in Africa, such as stagnating growth, high unemployment, declining commodity prices and an escalating debt burden, all provide a breeding ground for instability and conflict. Access to natural resources is a key factor in the link between the economy and the potential for conflict in Africa.

The AIV therefore believes that as part of its efforts to prevent conflict in Africa, the Netherlands should take steps to ensure that no population group within African countries is systematically excluded from the distribution and benefits of natural resources. If this appears likely to happen, then the government of the country concerned should be called to account and asked to provide systematic reports.

Conflicts are frequently financed by the proceeds of the smuggling of, and trade in, diamonds, gold and drugs. It is important that the G8 nations, which account for the lion's share of the global trade in diamonds, acknowledge the urgency of the problem of the illegal trade and have pledged their commitment to assisting the regional enforcement of laws and regulations in Africa. The United Kingdom's decision to demand certificates of origin before processing diamonds should also be given support. The UN Security Council has issued a presidential declaration asking the Secretary General to appoint a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of commodities from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the role this may be playing in the ongoing conflict there.

The Netherlands should continue to actively support recent initiatives to stamp out the illegal trade in diamonds and to improve the quality of certificates of origin. In doing so, it can exploit the involvement of civil society in Africa, and in particular the experience of one or two NGOs in this area. The AIV also believes that the Netherlands should continue to support international and African efforts to combat trade in hard drugs.

Existing social structures in Africa are under pressure. Large-scale migration leads to the unravelling of traditional social structures and increases instability.

The AIV feels that the Netherlands' efforts to help alleviate the problems caused by migration should not be restricted to the national level, central governments or the major cities, but that they should also target smaller towns and rural areas where migrants seek refuge - and those areas which people are leaving. More attention should be given in development programmes to the creation of jobs in new emerging cities and non-agricultural sectors.

The spread of HIV and the consequences of Aids are having severe demographic repercussions, and this can in turn harbour the seeds of conflict. In 2000, the Netherlands allocated around USD 40 million to the International Aids Vaccine Initiative.

In addition to supporting general measures to combat Aids, the Netherlands should also continue to call for greater openness on sexuality and Aids, including within the armed forces of African countries. The information that is already being disseminated to military personnel in this regard by the DPKO, UNFPA and UNAIDS, among others, should be encouraged and supported by the Netherlands.

The AIV recommends that the Netherlands strengthen its various existing care mechanisms for Aids sufferers and their relatives (extended families, child-headed families, orphanages) within a sector-wide approach. Job creation programmes should take account of the care that participants must - or have had to - give to relatives with Aids.

Youngsters who grow up under the threat of Aids, inadequate educational and other provisions and extended armed conflicts frequently fall prey to the temptation to use violence themselves.

The AIV recommends that the Netherlands give high priority to the growing number of marginalised youngsters in Africa, given that they are particularly susceptible to recruitment by militias and criminal organisations. The AIV believes that the Netherlands should therefore do more to help generate employment for young people in Africa, with a view to offering them an alternative to participation in armed conflicts and the prospect of a brighter future. The Netherlands is already co-funding organisations in South Africa which organise employment and training for marginalised youngsters.

In early 2000, the UN working party reached agreement on an optional protocol to the UN Treaty on the Rights of the Child concerning the deployment of children in armed conflicts. In the past, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DD&R programmes tended to be introduced into post-conflict situations. Now, however, these programmes are also used as a means of preventing conflicts and escalating crime.

The Netherlands should therefore also continue to cofinance DD&R programmes specifically targeted at youngsters in Africa, as an instrument for conflict prevention and in countries affected by serious crime.

The relationship between gender, security and conflict is many-sided. Although women are generally prevented from participating in armed forces and militias, their rights are frequently seriously violated during conflicts, for example through systematic rape. Yet women can play a positive role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution and in the rebuilding of communities ravaged by war. They can also acquire a more autonomous economic and social status during a conflict.

The AIV therefore feels that the Netherlands should continue to give explicit and systematic attention in its Africa policy to the role of gender in relation to questions of security and stability. This means, among other things, that the Netherlands should continue to assist the prosecution and sentencing of those who are guilty of rape, as is currently being done by the Rwanda tribunal. A larger financial allocation should therefore be earmarked for UNIFEM, and local gender and security projects should be funded.

The signing of a formal treaty marks the start of the post-conflict phase, centring on reconstruction and reconciliation. The bridging of both economic and social and political differences at this stage is crucial. One possibility is to exploit common traditions and institutions for conflict mediation.

The AIV believes that the Netherlands can contribute to peace processes in Africa by supporting socially embedded reconciliation campaigns and by involving civil society in these campaigns. The emphasis must lie on encouraging the population and local organisations to accept the peace treaties with a view to restoring peace and social cohesion. Women's organisations should be included in these efforts.

All the OAU member states have now signed the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. A characteristic of the Charter is the inclusion of collective rights, such as the right of peoples to political and economic self-determination, to peace and security, to development and to a habitable environment.

The AIV recommends that the Netherlands provide financial support to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in a way that boosts the Commission's independence. Due to the important role played by the Commission, such support will promote the further development, refinement and enforcement of the African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights.

In the interests of good governance and good policy, the Netherlands should devote more attention to the need for an independent judiciary and legal profession to promote the stability, security and development of African countries. The Netherlands should also support campaigns to increase awareness of the need to respect human rights. The rights of refugees and of displaced persons deserve special protection. The AIV believes that the Netherlands should closely monitor the activities of the various African national commissions for the promotion and protection of human rights and, if requested to do so, should provide support to those commissions which are sufficiently independent and satisfy the Paris Principles.

International political involvement in Africa has changed since the end of the Cold War. The UN has found it difficult in recent years to get peace operations in Africa off the ground. Dutch participation in UNMEE appears to be the exception to the rule.

The AIV feels that the chief way in which the Netherlands can pursue an effective policy on security and stability in Africa is through multilateral fora such as the UN and the European Union. Outside these fora, the Netherlands can try to work with like-minded donor countries in consortia and coalitions. However, the AIV does not see the combining of forces with like-minded donors as a fully-fledged alternative to existing multilateral fora, but rather as a springboard for the forging of coalitions within the United Nations and the European Union.

EU policy on Africa has traditionally concentrated on development cooperation. The recent Cotonou Convention (signed on 23 June 2000), the successor to Lomé, has been allocated a budget of EUR 14.3 billion for the first five years. One of the new Convention's aims is the gradual integration of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) into the global economy. In addition to political dialogue between the EU member states and the ACP states concerning human rights, democratisation and the constitutional state, the signatories can now also discuss conflict prevention, organised crime, drugs, the arms trade and the repatriation of illegal immigrants. Civil society and the private sector are also specifically included in these discussions. European Union member states must also coordinate their respective policies on Africa. In May 2000, the Netherlands included 'conflicts in Africa' on the agenda of the General Affairs Council. The ministers also agreed to work with other donors, the World Bank and interested African countries to seek ways of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating the combatants. The EU is willing to provide financial assistance for the repatriation of refugees and for the recovery of the most severely affected regions.

The WEU developed activities aimed at increasing peacekeeping opportunities in Africa. Many of these activities, for example with regard to the provision of advice on mine clearance, will end in 2001.

The AIV believes that the Netherlands should ensure that when the WEU activities come to a close, those activities pertaining to Africa which are found to have had positive results, should be transferred to the European Union.

In 2001, the government included a peace fund in its budget, to be used to finance activities aimed at strengthening the peacekeeping capacity of developing countries. It will mainly provide incidental contributions to short-term activities. The peace fund will be allocated an annual NLG 15 million.

In order to increase the capacity of African countries to promote security and stability throughout the continent, the Netherlands should continue to provide support for African regional initiatives through the transfer of knowledge, experience and capital. This can be done either through an extra allocation to the peace fund or via the regular flow of development aid.

In 1991, the former Nigerian head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, put forward a proposal for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSS-DCA). The AIV believes that it is less important to replicate the OSCE model itself than to introduce the underlying perceptions and ideas of the OSCE into the political discussion in Africa

The Netherlands has elected to become Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 2003. It should use this opportunity to launch initiatives aimed at introducing the principles and ideas underlying the OSCE into the political discussion in Africa. With this in mind, it should seek to promote a dialogue between the OSCE and OAU.

According to a reply from the government to questions tabled in the House of Representatives of the States General, less than 50% of the Netherlands' development budget is currently spent on Africa.

The AIV feels that the Netherlands should honour its pledge to the UN Secretary General to allocate 50% of its development aid to Africa.

Annexes

Request for advice

Dear Professor Lubbers,

On 17 August 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation presented the Lower House with a memorandum on the main lines of Dutch policy on Africa. Its two main development objectives are to promote security and stability, and good governance and good policy. During the discussion of both the Africa memorandum and the budget, it became clear that the Lower House supports this emphasis. We are now writing to request recommendations on one of these two objectives: the promotion of security and stability in Africa.

The memorandum on Africa states that African countries and organisations themselves should bear primary responsibility for conflict prevention and control. At the Organisation of African Unity's July 1999 summit in Algiers, African heads of state endorsed this principle. The Africans themselves hold the key to peace on their continent. This does not however imply that the Netherlands should take a wait-and-see approach to the complex problems there. At least four arguments suggest the Netherlands should support African efforts to attain peace and stability.

First of all, **devoting more attention to conflicts in Africa is in our own interest.** Instability in Africa affects Europe's security. Consequences could include increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, and the export of criminal activity (drug-related crime in particular). The loss of current or potential trading partners would also affect Europe. During the Cold War, conflicts in Africa were part of the power struggle between the First and Second Worlds. The collapse of that bipolar structure has led to a new political situation in which conflicts are more difficult to control. Security policy in European and North American capitals still looks mainly to the east and to the Balkans in particular. We should not, however, lose sight of the many conflicts raging in Africa.

A second argument for supporting peace and stability in Africa is that many African countries and organisations **lack the financial and/or institutional capacity needed** to intervene in time when a crisis looms. Various studies have shown that intervention early in a conflict, before violence breaks out, is more effective and cheaper than intervention after a situation has escalated. Furthermore, it is more difficult and dangerous to reserve action for the later stages of a conflict. Regional cooperation, economic and otherwise, can help to prevent or reduce conflicts.

A third argument for Dutch support is based on the fact that as much as half our funds for bilateral development cooperation are spent in Africa. **Development cooperation and politics are inseparable.** Security and stability create a positive climate for development, and socioeconomic development in turn fosters security and stability. This justifies a broad, integrated and coherent approach of the kind we advocated in the memorandum on Africa and in the spirit of the UN Secretary-General's report on the causes of conflict.

Finally, closing our eyes to Africa's wars and its many refugees is unacceptable from a **humanitarian perspective.** Why intervene in conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor but not in Africa? The media's lack of interest is no excuse.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR DUTCH POLICY ON PROMOTING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA

Several basic principles determine the framework for the Dutch contribution to a 'security policy' for Africa. First of all, as the memorandum on Africa indicates, to ensure that policy is effective, the foreign affairs, defence and development cooperation ministers must make **a coordinated and coherent effort** to carry out that policy in the context of political, economic and development relations, each on the basis of his or her own responsibilities and instruments. A variety of instruments, including diplomacy, peace operations, observer missions, demarcation, arms embargoes, sanctions and humanitarian aid, should all contribute to a coherent policy that is adjusted according to each individual situation.

The second basic principle is that policy should be pursued **both bilaterally and multilaterally** (the latter in the European Union, the United Nations, the international financial institutions, the World Trade Organisation and African regional organisations, and in cooperation with other donor activities). Each of these channels has advantages and disadvantages and the challenge is to find the right mix of instruments for each specific country and situation. Very different channels may be appropriate in different cases. Experience has frequently shown that because of its status as an 'impartial' partner in Africa, and as a major donor, the Netherlands is often able to enter into significant dialogues with African governments and organisations (as part of a 'Group of Friends', for example).

The third principle underlying Dutch policy derives from **the results of recent studies into the causes of conflict**, which have deepened our insight into how violent conflicts arise. For instance, one conclusion of a recent study by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', entitled 'Causes of Conflict in the Third World', was that factors such as a country's institutional capacity, the degree to which power is distributed and changes in access to economic resources can play an important role in precipitating or preventing conflict. Good governance, security and stability are inextricably bound together. The OECD Development Centre shares this view.

The fourth principle is that **current African conflicts have changed since the Cold War**. More and more, intrastate conflicts have taken the place of inter-state wars. The traditional view of conflicts, which focuses exclusively on the state as actor, cannot be applied to the current situation in Africa. A broader approach should be taken, in which security is seen as 'the absence of threat to acquired values'.

Finally, according to Stephen Ellis, researcher at the African Studies Centre **political power in Africa is largely determined by contacts with the outside world**. Factors such as ownership-oriented approach to development cooperation and the Netherlands' choice of partners within an African country can therefore affect that country's internal power relations and the security situation in the region in question.

QUESTIONS

An AIV report responding to the questions stated briefly below could be very helpful in working out the further details of Dutch policy on Africa.

1. What is the AIV's view on the development of security and stability in Africa?
2. How should security and stability in Africa be promoted?
3. What contributions can international partners and the Netherlands in particular make to the promotion of security and stability in Africa?
4. Which aspects of Dutch policy could be made more coherent?

Yours sincerely,

Jozias van Aartsen
Minister of Foreign Affairs
on behalf of the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation

List of abbreviations

ACP	Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs
ANC	African National Congress
CAVV	Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CNV	National Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAF/MA	Sub-Saharan Africa Department/Central and Eastern Africa Division
DD&R	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes
DMV	Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EU	European Union
FNV	Trade Union Confederation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GI/KPA	Municipal Initiatives/Small-scale local activities programme
GNP	Gross National Product
HGIS	Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation
HIPCI	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPI	International Cooperation Personnel Branch/'Experts Programme'
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute of Social Studies
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies

ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MFP	Cofinancing Programmes
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIZA	Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa
NPLF	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	Other Official Flows
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCASED	Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PF	Private Flows
PSO	Association of Dutch Non-governmental Organisations for Personnel Services Overseas
RECOMP	Renforcement des Capacités de Maintien de la Paix
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDA	Sustainable Development Agreement
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation SNV
SNZI	Foundation for the New South Africa
SWVP	Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA	National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
US	United States
VMP	Trade Union Cofinancing Programme
VPO	Food Security and Nutritional Improvement Programme
WEU	West European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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